

**BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE  
DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION  
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND LESSONS LEARNED**

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## **I. BACKGROUND**

### **THE HIGH POINT EXPERIENCE**

In 2004, officials in the High Point Police Department (HPPD) in High Point, North Carolina similar to police executives in many communities, had grown tired and frustrated with open-air drug markets and their associated crime and disorder. With the blessing of a new Police Chief, HPPD set out to try something new. Based on the successes of the Boston Gun Project (Kennedy, 1996) and similar strategic problem solving approaches (e.g., Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, and Cronin, 2008, McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, and Corsaro, 2006), as well as the department's experience with gun and gang violence reduction through Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN), HPPD set out to implement a strategic, focused, data driven project to eliminate drug markets. Rather than focusing on individual drug users and sellers, they focused on shutting down drug markets using a nine-step process (to be discussed later in this document). Their first effort in the West End Neighborhood produced a reported average crime decrease of 57 percent over four years in that neighborhood. According to local residents and the police, the open-air drug market literally disappeared overnight. And, just as interesting, there seemed to have been no displacement effect.<sup>1</sup> That is, HPPD closed down the open-air drug markets in the West End neighborhood without finding evidence of the market reopening elsewhere.

The High Point Police Department implemented a total of four drug market interventions from 2004 to 2007. And, as seen in the West End, the drug markets collapsed overnight in the other three target neighborhoods as well. In addition to the reduction in drug and violent crime normally associated with overt drug markets, there were noticeable, palatable, positive effects for all four communities. Indeed, some of the most powerful indicators of changes in the neighborhoods have come from local residents. For example, each year around 100 children attended Vacation Bible School (VBS) at a local church in the West End Neighborhood. Of those 100 children, the most that ever attended that lived in the immediate neighborhood was six. The rest of the attendees drove in from other areas. After the call-in in 2004, VBS attendance increased to over 130 children and 36 of those children were from the immediate West End neighborhood. The Pastor of the church overheard a little boy tell another that it was also "...okay to walk to the church because the neighborhood is alright now." A similar story was told in Rockford (IL), one of the first communities to implement the High Point model for eliminating drug markets. There, the president of the Rockford Neighborhood Association reported to the Deputy Chief that he had trick-or-treaters in his neighborhood for the first time after their call-in. Indeed, whereas the neighborhood experienced no trick-or-treaters in 2006, there were 12 in 2007 and over 100 in 2008.

The West End Initiative, now known generally as the Drug Market Intervention (DMI), has attracted a tremendous amount of attention. Neighboring cities in North Carolina like Raleigh, Winston-Salem, and Greensboro learned about the initiative from High Point. The National Advocacy Center (NAC) in Columbia, South Carolina held a two-day conference for PSN Districts on the High Point DMI program. Now, cities like Rockford (IL), Providence (RI), Hempstead (NY), and Nashville (TN) have all implemented the DMI strategy with reports of

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<sup>1</sup>A formal evaluation is occurring right now.

success similar to High Point (see Figure A-3 in the Appendix for a list of many of the communities that have implemented the DMI).

Preliminary evaluation results of the High Point West End DMI conducted by the Michigan State University research team indicate that violent crime as well as drug related and nuisance offenses experienced statistically significant reductions (seen in ARIMA time-series models) in the West End neighborhood at the time of the intervention (i.e., the notification 'call-in'). Although only limited formal evaluation results are available, the data that do exist suggest neighborhood-level impact in the communities that have implemented DMI. For example, the target neighborhood in Rockford experienced a 31 percent decline in non-violent offenses and 15 percent in violent offenses following the DMI intervention (Corsaro and McGarrell, 2008). Nashville's target area witnessed a 46 percent decline in calls-for-police service and very large declines in arrests for drug charges, drug equipment, and prostitution (Nash, 2008).

### **THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE (BJA) DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION PROGRAM (DMI)**

Given the success of the DMI in High Point and other early adopter jurisdictions, in 2007 the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provided funding for Michigan State University (MSU) along with American University (AU) and John Jay College of Criminal Justice to train up to ten jurisdictions in the Drug Market Intervention strategy. The Drug Market Intervention Training Program consists of a one day Point of Contact (POC) meeting and three two-day trainings directed at four person teams (representing the police, the prosecutor, an influential community member, and social services) from each jurisdiction. The POC training is designed to help the point of contact for each site consider and work through critical issues like team selection, timelines, and options for implementation. The first training includes an overall orientation to the DMI strategy and instructions on how to get started. The second training focuses on critical issues that may arise during the implementation process and further refining the DMI approach for each jurisdiction and the third training is centered on peer-to-peer support and discussion with regards to DMI implementation.

These trainings draw on a wide variety of faculty including individuals from the BJA funded institutions as well as individuals from High Point and the many other cities that have successfully implemented the DMI.

DMI Round I Trainings occurred from November 2007 to July 2008 and included nine sites: Baltimore (MD), Chicago (IL), Cook County (IL), Dallas (TX), Durham (NC), Indianapolis (IN), Milwaukee (WI), New Haven (CT), and Ocala, (FL).<sup>2</sup>

In July 2008, BJA solicited Requests for Commitments for sites interested in Round II of the Drug Market Intervention Training Program. Round II began in early 2009 and with nine participating sites: Atlanta (GA), Fitchburg (MA), Memphis (TN), Mesa (AZ), Middletown (OH), Ocala (FL), Peoria (IL), Providence (RI), and Seattle (WA). Round III will begin in fall 2010.

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<sup>2</sup> Ocala (FL) was a late-comer in the initial training and has continued in the second round of DMI training.

## **CLARIFYING FUNDAMENTALS**

It is important to clarify what the Drug Market Intervention is and what it is not. Specifically, DMI is a strategic and focused intervention intended to shut down or eliminate open-air drug markets, and thereby reduce crime and violence in a target neighborhood. The goal is to return the neighborhood from the drug dealers back to the community. Simply put, there are four interlaced goals of the DMI: 1) eliminate open-air drug markets; 2) return the neighborhood to the residents; 3) reduce crime and disorder; and 4) improve the public's safety as well as their quality of life. As a Reverend from Rockford (IL) said, "[t]his is not treatment but rather completely changing our diet. We are changing community norms and expectations." Our residents are now making demands for other city services to help us build a "healthy community." A Deputy Chief from the Rockford Police Department summarizes the fundamentals of DMI, "[i]t's not about the people you are giving a break, the story is about improving the quality of life in the community. The goal is returning the neighborhood to the residents so they are not living in a war zone."

Although drug dealers working in the target areas are the focus of a considerable amount of attention during the DMI implementation, the DMI is not primarily focused on changing individuals. Rather, as noted above, it is about changing the neighborhood. Further, DMI is not focused on individual therapy and it does not involve coddling offenders. Indeed, the most serious dealers, particularly those with a history of violent crime, are likely to face long prison sentences. Mid- and lower-level dealers, however, are offered a second chance as their criminal charges are used as leverage to close the market and, hopefully, influence their behavior. The High Point team, working with John Jay's David Kennedy, believes that after insisting that the drug dealers stop dealing drugs in a neighborhood, it is important to provide those that are diverted from prosecution with assistance and options. They are, in essence, eliminating drug dealing as an occupational choice in that neighborhood. While taking advantage of offered services is not required, many individuals participating in the DMI do so.

As noted above, DMI builds on a set of principles that emerged out of problem solving practices begun in the Boston Gun Project (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; Braga, Kennedy, Piehl, and Waring, 2001), extended in the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (McGarrell et al., 2006; Roehl, Rosenbaum, Costello, Coldren, Jr., Schuck, Kunard, and Forde, 2008) and incorporated in PSN ([www.psn.gov](http://www.psn.gov); McGarrell, Hipple, Corsaro, Bynum, Perez, Zimmermann, and Garmo, 2009). These include focused, deterrence-based interventions, police-community collaboration, the re-assertion of community control of the neighborhood, and increased police and criminal justice legitimacy.

## **FOCUSED, DETERRENCE-BASED INTERVENTIONS**

An accumulating body of research indicates that police interventions are most effective when they are highly focused on the people, places, and contexts driving the problem (National Research Council, 2005). DMI follows this principle by focusing on specific drug markets in identifiable geographic locations. Law enforcement attention, as described subsequently, is focused on the individuals working in the drug market as distributors, street-level sellers, and look-outs. The model is built on the "pulling levers" concept of directly communicating a

deterrence message to the small group of offenders driving the problem (Kennedy, 1998; McDevitt, Decker, Hipple, McGarrell, 2006). The DMI maximizes the power of the deterrence message by actually building undercover cases against the target population and using the aggressive prosecution of violent offenders as examples to increase the credibility of the threat of prosecution. This is a dramatic departure of traditional drug enforcement whereby dealers often operate in relative anonymity and where the odds of imprisonment per sale of cocaine are estimated as low as one for every 15,000 sales (Boyum and Reuter, 2005).

### **POLICE-COMMUNITY COLLABORATION AND RECONCILIATION**

Open air drug markets and drug enforcement have exacted a heavy toll on poor and minority neighborhoods. Drug markets both reflect and exacerbate breakdown in community social control characterized by disorder, crime, and fear of crime. As drug dealers exert control over public space, residents withdraw. At the same time, four decades of drug enforcement have resulted in cycles of enforcement that result in large numbers of young dealers being incarcerated only to be replaced by a new group of young people drawn to the economic rewards of drug sales. The reality that the sellers involved in open-air drug markets, who comprise the majority of incarcerated drug offenders, are disproportionately people of color whereas the buyers are often white and non-local, also has been a source of conflict and suspicion between police and residents of these neighborhoods. DMI represents a recognition of a “new way” of dealing with drug markets. The police will not ignore the plight of residents suffering from the presence of a drug market. At the same time, the response of police, prosecutors and other local officials will not solely be focused on arrest and incarceration but rather enforcement will be selectively focused on the most chronic and violent offenders while at the same time offering second chances and social support to lower level (i.e., non-chronic and non-violent) dealers and look-outs. The experience of High Point, Providence, Hempstead, Rockford and Nashville has been that this process of collective order implementation has resulted in police/criminal justice reconciliation with community members, increased legitimacy and long-standing partnerships to ensure the drug market does not re-emerge (Kennedy, 2009).

### **RE-ASSERTION OF COMMUNITY SOCIAL CONTROL**

An outgrowth of the police-community reconciliation is that the local community residents re-assert control over public space and behavior in the neighborhood. In brief, open-air dealing is no longer tolerated. The Commander from the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department describes the DMI intervention as providing an opportunity for the neighborhood “to gather its breath,” recognize that the dealing has stopped, and to reclaim the neighborhood. Simply put, dealing is not tolerated and if witnessed will either result in a resident intervening or calling the police. The police, in turn, both request that residents be the “eyes and the ears” and call when they witness suspicious behavior but also make the commitment to respond if and when dealing re-emerges. The communities that have implemented DMI have committed to some level of increased police presence following the initial arrests and call-in meeting (described subsequently), but gradual withdrawal as the community asserts control.

Ultimately DMI is about restoring a degree of health within the neighborhood so that open air drug dealing is not tolerated. A reverend from Rockland (IL) draws the analogy to HIV AIDS.

HIV becomes deadly due to the weakened immune system. Drug dealers seek neighborhoods with weakened immunities so that the dealers can do their business with little risk of neighborhood intrusion. Where DMI has been successfully implemented, local residents have boosted the neighborhood's immunity by re-asserting control over public space in collaboration with the police.

## **COMPLIANCE THROUGH LEGITIMACY**

A growing literature in criminal justice and regulation demonstrates that individuals are much more likely to be compliant with the law when they perceive the law and the justice system as legitimate (Tyler, 1990). Although additional research on the DMI intervention is needed to clarify the specific mechanisms, observations and discussions with both local residents and justice officials suggests that this approach to drug enforcement increases the legitimacy of the law. Recognizing that drug enforcement has not solved the problem of illegal drug use and has often had an unintended negative effect on poor, minority neighborhoods appears to be part of this process. Similarly, distinguishing between chronic, violent offenders who need to be removed from the community and non-violent, lower level offenders who are given fair warning and offered support to get out of the drug trade, also appears to increase the legitimacy of the police and the criminal justice system. At the same time, DMI represents a meaningful response to the problems caused by drug markets. This focused, firm, but fair response to drug markets appears to have legitimacy among both local residents and the justice system officials who take a chance and implement this approach.

Ultimately, these core components of the DMI are planned and implemented according to nine steps as they were captured by the High Point Police Department. Other cities have studied and helped refine these steps. Although adapted to the context of each site, participants in the process consistently point to the importance of working through all nine steps. When implementation problems have emerged, they are attributed to lack of attention to one of more of these steps. As Assistant United States Attorney in the Middle District of North Carolina, has stated, "the nine steps are a recipe. When you follow the recipe, it works. When you don't, it doesn't produce the results you want to see."

## **II. LESSONS LEARNED ORGANIZED ALONG NINE STEPS**

This implementation and lessons learned guide is organized by the nine basic steps for implementing the Drug Market Intervention Initiative as developed by the High Point Police Department. Within each step there are suggestions for implementing the step as well as common questions and issues to discuss with possible responses to the questions. These suggestions were culled from the initial rounds of DMI trainings where officials from High Point, Raleigh, Winston-Salem, Providence, Rockford, Hempstead and Nashville served as faculty and offered the advice described below.

## **PLANNING PHASE**

### **FORMING THE DMI TEAM AND ASSESSING READINESS**

- Who are the necessary team members?
  - a. Police/Sheriff's Department
  - b. Prosecutor's Office
  - c. Influential community member
  - d. Social services
  
- Who else do we need to bring to the team and what is their role?
  - a. City management/Mayor's Office
    - A good representative will be able to help navigate the unavoidable political waters
  - b. United States Attorney's Office
    - The USAO should be able to partner with local prosecution to help in deciding the best prosecution venue for those ineligible candidates (see Decker et al., 2006)
  - c. Faith based organizations
    - These partners will help build trust with law enforcement and know how to reach out to a clientele that may be difficult to reach
  - d. Probation and Parole
    - Many candidates may be ex-offenders and probation and parole may provide some additional "levers" to be pulled
  - e. Outreach workers
    - These partners will know how to reach out to a clientele that may be difficult to reach
  - f. Reentry services
    - Many candidates may be ex-offenders and reentry service providers may be able to offer helpful information and connection to services
  - g. Research partner (local college or university)
    - A good research partner will be able to help with data analysis, provide analytical feedback, and evaluate the initiative.

### **SWOT ANALYSIS**

- What Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats do we have to build on to plan and implement the DMI?

*DMI is a strategic, focused, data driven initiative whose sole purpose is to eliminate the open-air drug markets in a target area. This is done market by market, not jurisdiction wide.*

*It is essential to have the "right" people at the table from the very beginning. That is, each representative needs to be in a decision making role within their organization or have direct access to someone with a decision making role. This is especially important for the police and prosecutor whose participation and understanding of the DMI initiative is imperative at the operational level. A well- respected community member and someone from the city*



*management or the Mayor's Office can be extremely important when politics come into play (and they will).*

*Getting the DMI going may require a "translator." That is, someone who can speak the language of DMI for different groups. And, this person does not necessarily need to be from the target area.*

*Once the team is formed, doing a SWOT analysis will help with identifying strengths, opportunities, threats that will need to be addressed by the team.*

### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- How is this different than Community Oriented Policing?

*DMI encompasses many Community Oriented Policing philosophies including community partnerships and problem-solving. However, implementing DMI does not take a complete organizational overhaul. DMI is a strategic, focused, data driven initiative whose sole purpose is to eliminate open-air drug markets. This is done market by market, not jurisdiction wide. Additionally, the police are not the only leaders in DMI efforts. Equally important are the prosecutor and the community. Community Oriented Policing is only part of the DMI as it also includes elements from Intelligence-Led Policing.*

- In larger departments/cities, how do we get support and commitment from a variety of units and stakeholders?
- We do not have decision-makers at the table (people that can help move things along).

*It is important to have the right people at the table from the beginning. Tasking a low ranking officer with garnering support from unit supervisors does not make sense. Know or learn your local resources (e.g. strong community leaders, social service providers, faith-based organizations) and invite the best representatives to join your DMI team. If time passes and you do not think someone is pulling their weight, try and bring someone else on to the team.*

- This sounds like a hug-a-thug program.

*This is anything but a hug-a-thug program. In all sites to date, serious violent drug offenders were arrested and prosecuted. Your team will create the criteria that will determine which drug dealers will be eligible for the call-in and which will not be eligible. Since you have the prosecutor's office as part of your team, you should be able to determine the appropriate venue, state or federal prosecution, to pursue against those drug dealers deemed ineligible for the call-in. Common criteria include a history of violence and/or gun crimes. Secondly, those drug dealers that are invited to the call-in will be closely monitored. If he or she fails to uphold their end of the agreement, the necessary casework has already been done to arrest and prosecute these individuals. Rather than being soft on offenders, the DMI is built in increasing the level of credibility of the threat of prosecution for continued offending.*

- How long does it take to get to the call-in stage?

*The answer to this question is very case specific and can be unique to each site. However, once all the necessary pieces are in place, a good time estimate for getting from the site selection stage to the call-in is about seven to 11 months.*

- How do we keep the DMI from stalling out during personnel turnover?

*This is a very common issue with any criminal justice initiative. Again, having the right people at the table from the beginning is important. It is unlikely that all your key team members will leave at once, so if one does leave, the others can work to find a suitable replacement- someone with equal standing within that organization. One role of your core team members is to build knowledge of and support for the DMI program within their respective organizations.*

## **TARGETING THE DRUG MARKET**

### ***Step 1- Crime Mapping***

Goal: Define a narrow target area.

- Assess data sources
  - Calls for service
  - UCR Part I Crimes
    - Crimes involving drugs, weapons, sex, prostitution
  - Field contacts made by Narcotics Unit
- Map data
  - Police Beat layer
  - Neighborhood layer
  - Census block layer
- Identify high concentrations
- Identify broad target area
- Examine drug buy locations (layer on map)
- Define target area
- Consider evaluation issues (see item VI)

### ***Common Questions/Issues:***

- Selecting an area not based on the data.

*This is a data driven initiative. Selecting the target area based on anything but the data is a departure from the DMI model and asking for trouble (see next item). Often times, the police may think they know the “worst” area (through assumption, perception or personal preference) but the data may reveal something else. Even where the police knowledge and the data coincide, taking the time to gather the crime data can increase the legitimacy of the project. Fears of “targeting” and “profiling” can be mitigated by crime maps indicating why a particular neighborhood was selected for the intervention. Data analysis can also provide micro-level information (e.g., specific problem addresses) so your focus can be strategic and directed. Again, the target area needs to be at the neighborhood or drug market level where community support can be garnered.*

- Politics are trying to influence site selection.

*Using data for target area selection creates an easy response when political forces arise and try to influence your decision. Every politician wants to direct resources to their constituents especially ones that may help lower the crime rate.*

- Selecting too large of a target area.

*This is another common issue with criminal justice initiatives. Too broad a target area basically waters down the “dosage” of the initiative preventing any real measureable effect. Again, politics may come into play as city council representatives or other political figures push to have the initiative take place in their district. How can you choose just ONE neighborhood or drug market when there are more than one that warrant attention? DMI is meant to be implemented drug market by drug market, neighborhood by neighborhood. Many communities have chosen to use a rolling model whereby as one intervention unfolds, intelligence gathering and undercover operations begin in the next target area.*

- What if there are other criminal justice programs already existing in the target area (e.g. PSN; Weed and Seed)?
- How can you/do we want to work with existing criminal justice programs?

*The above two questions are interrelated. No criminal justice program exists in a vacuum. The existence of other criminal justice programs should not be a deterrent for implementing DMI in that neighborhood. It may be possible to spread the cost of DMI across many different programs. For example, the West End Neighborhood (High Point, NC) was part of a Weed and Seed area. The High Point Police Department was able to use Weed and Seed funds to help pay for extra patrols during the suppression part of their DMI initiative. While multiple criminal justice programs operating in a target area at the same time creates some issues for evaluation, it also lends itself to resource pooling and building on existing progress or neighborhood improvements.*

- What about community capacity in the possible target area?

*While it is best to let the data direct you to your target area, it is also important to consider the community capacity in the area as well. Is the potential target area one that will have residents who will get involved? Will there be adequate social services in the area for the call-in candidates? For example, Chicago (IL) did not select the “worst of the worst” neighborhood for its DMI; they instead picked one with medium level open-air drug markets where they believed there was strong potential for community involvement. The Commander in Providence (RI) stressed that “the community needs to ‘have your back’ for the first time one of these guys given a break commits a violent crime.”*

### **Step 2- Survey**

Goal: Find out about the drug dealers in the target area, who they are and where they live.

- Survey street level police officers
- Survey probation officers
- Survey vice/narcotics officers
- Survey community members
- Create a list of key addresses and players

#### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- We “know” there are hundreds of dealers in the area—there are just too many to make a list.

*Experience in all sites to date indicates the number of drug dealers in a given neighborhood or drug market is manageable if the size of the target area is reasonable. It is important to gather data and information from many sources. As with site selection, use the data to guide your intervention.*

### **Step 3- Incident Review**

Goal: Conduct a modified incident review.

- Utilize research team
- Convene vice and narcotics officers and street level officers that work the identified target area
- Review information gathered in Step 2
  - Person by person
- Examine and organize information
  - Police contacts
  - Police reports
  - Intelligence
- Perform link analysis if applicable

#### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- Who facilitates the review?

*This is a great opportunity to partner with a local university or college if you have not already done so. It is often helpful to have the incident review facilitated by someone not involved with the cases. However, if guidelines and expectations are created ahead of time, someone from the narcotics unit or another team member could facilitate the review. A research partner or crime analyst could help with organizing and analyzing the information brought forth at the review. A research partner could also help with program evaluation. Consider inviting a research partner to be part of your core team from the beginning.*

### **Step 3a- Refine list**

Goal: Refine list of drug dealers to include only those still active in the target area.

Important questions:

- Is the dealer a street-level or mid-level dealer?
- Does he or she have a history of violence?
- Does he or she have any pending charges?

**Common Questions/Issues:**

- How do you define “active”?

*This is another question where the answer may change depending on the site. You certainly do not want to spend your time and resources on individuals that really only made one or two sales in your target area and are no longer active. You will rely on those individuals who attend the call-in to spread the word that open-air drug dealing will not be tolerated in the target area. This should address the issue of small time or infrequent dealers.*

**Step 3b- Identify Call-in candidates**

Goal: Narrow list to Call-in candidates.

- Convene police and prosecutors (both local and federal)
- Decide who, if anyone, should be prosecuted immediately based on some of the review criteria.

-Proceed with cases on those deemed not eligible for Call-in

- The remaining individuals will be targeted for the Call-in

**Common Questions/Issues:**

- What criteria should be used to distinguish between those who are arrested/prosecuted and those who are offered a second chance?

*These criteria are similar but different from site to site. Common criteria include a history of violence and/or gun crimes. Impact of prosecution can also be good criteria, that is, are you able to pursue federal charges that may put the drug dealer away for longer? Rockford (IL) formed a team comprised of the police department, sheriff's department, States' Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Attorney's Office to screen all cases and determine who should get a second chance. Milwaukee (WI) and Chicago (IL) reached out to community members, vice/narcotics officers, and gang units to ensure they were not offering a second chance to someone who was a danger to the community.*

- This sounds like a hug-a-thug program.

*As noted above, this is anything but a hug-a-thug program. Your team will create the criteria that will determine which drug dealers will be eligible for the call-in and which will not be eligible and instead will be arrested and prosecuted. Since you have the prosecutor's office as part of your team, you should be able to determine the appropriate venue, state or federal prosecution, to pursue against those drug dealers deemed ineligible for the call-in. Common criteria include a history of violence and/or gun crimes. Secondly, those drug dealers that are invited to the call-in will be closely monitored. If he or she fails to uphold their end of the agreement, the necessary casework has already been done to arrest and prosecute these individuals.*

- When do you arrest those who are deemed ineligible to participate in the call-in?

*Those individuals that your team deems ineligible for the call-in should be arrested prior to, but close in time proximity, to the call in. This has differed from community to community based on factors such as officer safety, potential compromise of undercover operations, and status of community collaboration. A sample of the time ranges is presented in Appendix A3.*

#### **Step 4- Undercover Operations**

Goal: Build cases on Call-in candidates

- Undercover officers make buys
- Send confidential informants to make buys
  - Utilize audio-taping, video-taping, and photographs.
- Police will document the activities of the drug dealers in any way that they can

#### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- How long should we spend building cases?

*As long as it takes to build solid cases on all the drug dealers in the target area. Some will be arrested right away while others will be invited to the call-in. It is important to have all the cases ready to take to the prosecutor in case someone invited to the call in makes the choice not to comply. Generally speaking, undercover operations last for one to three months (see Appendix A3).*

- Undercover Operations Resources

*If the police department is a member of their Regional Information Sharing Systems Program (i.e. MAGLOCLEN, MOCIC, NESPIN, ROCIC, WSIN), they have a wealth of services available to them. Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) is a federally funded program to support regional law enforcement efforts in combating crimes of all types. Services include analysis, funds to pay confidential informants, equipment loans, information sharing, technical assistance, and training. Nashville (TN) borrowed high tech surveillance equipment from their RISS (ROCIC) to help with their undercover operations.*

### **WORKING WITH THE COMMUNITY**

#### **Step 5- Mobilize the Community**

Goal: Obtain community buy-in

- Involve the key criminal justice players that have already been indentified
- Engage the community
- Engage the residents in the target area
- Engage the neighborhood leaders in the target areas
- Engage business owners (if applicable to your area)
- Engage the faith based members
- Hold a series of community meetings in the target area
- Brief the Mayor and the City Council on the strategy (this may not be your first briefing)

#### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- What do we tell the community? What is their role?

*DMI is a partnership that includes the community. The community will play a very important role in conveying the message that drug dealing will no longer be tolerated in the neighborhood. Often times, the police flood an area, make arrests, leave the area, and business goes back to the way it was before the flood. This is the community's chance to take back their neighborhood and keep it with the support of the police and each other. Think about planning for the needs of the community in immediate,*

*intermediate and long term steps. The community is more likely to report drug dealing and other crimes if they know they are backed by the police, the prosecutor, and the city. The hard part is going to be convincing community members that the police will not be leaving them and that they are in this for the long haul. The Chicago (IL) DMI team notes how significant it was for them to get the “right” community partner, in their case a local minister with strong community ties. They were able to build on the minister’s connections with the local schools to mobilize community involvement and resources.*

- Will the community participate? We have had difficulty getting the community involved in these drug market neighborhoods.

*This is a common concern in many of the participating jurisdictions. Experience has shown, however, that finding several local leaders who are willing to get involved seems to be the key. John Jay’s David Kennedy notes that success has come with a non-traditional approach to community organizing. Rather than getting every possible stakeholder together and reaching consensus, the key is to find several “doers” within the neighborhood who are willing to get involved. From this point, the process of engagement and reconciliation has proven to forge new functional partnerships. During one training session, Reverends Jim Summey and Sherman Mason from High Point (NC) and Edward Copeland from Rockford (IL) talked about community leaders who can act as “translators.” These key individuals, while not necessarily from the target area, can move among the various participating groups (police and prosecutors, social services, local residents) and assist in communicating the goals and processes of DMI in language that resonates with the various parties.*

- What about maintaining secrecy? Concerns about officer safety and integrity of undercover operation.

*It is important to maintain some degree of secrecy especially during the undercover operations. This is nothing new to the police; they have been doing these kinds of operations for years. However, once the undercover stage is completed, it is vital to work on getting the community involved. The community is going to be responsible for helping the police maintain the market shut down by providing support and resources to the call-in candidates. Some sites have initiated community and leadership involvement in concert with the undercover operations using a generic community improvement effort charge without identifying specifics of the DMI or the target area.*

- Where does the media fit in?

*It is well known that the relationship between the police and the media can be tenuous at times. Politics may play a role here as well. Some sites believed that inviting the media in too early could have jeopardized the initiative or created officer safety issues. Whether or not you include the media from the very beginning like Hempstead (ABC news) and Providence (a local reporter), it is important to be prepared to at least answer their questions. It may be helpful to have a designated media contact for the DMI initiative. Controlling the message so it is represented accurately in the media is very important. All partners must portray the same message. As a Deputy Chief from Rockford (IL) said, “...[DMI] is not about the people you are giving a break. The big story is improving the life of the community.” This type of message needs to be*

communicated to the media.

### **Step 5a- Set the Call-in time and place**

Goal: Identify police district headquarters or other appropriate location within the target area at which to hold the call-in.

#### ***Common Questions/Issues:***

- Should we have the call-in at a police station?
- What are other options for locations?

*There is no right or wrong answer to this question. This is something that is decided site by site. The majority of sites have held their call-ins at police stations (see Appendix A3). Others have used local schools or churches within the target area. Some sites prefer the message a police station sends to call-in participants. Others like them for security reasons or the availability of metal detectors. In other communities, officials prefer the symbolic message of holding the meeting in a community setting such as a community center, church or library. This is an issue that should be discussed early among team members.*

## **PREPARING FOR THE CALL-IN**

### ***Step 6- Contact with the offender's family***

Goal: Identify “influential” people in each targeted offender’s life.

- Family
- Friends
- Spiritual advisors
- Non-family members
- Small group visits to influentials
  - Explain goals of the initiative
  - Invite them to participate in asking offender to quit doing what they are doing
  - Encourage them to attend call-in

#### ***Common Questions/Issues:***

- Why do we contact offender family members and influentials?

*The influentials fulfill several roles. First, they can be instrumental in persuading the offender to attend the meeting. They can re-assure the offender that they will not be arrested when they attend. It is also an important opportunity to involve influentials who may be able to exert a pro-social influence on the offender after the call-in meeting occurs*

- How are influentials identified?

*This is a collaborative effort. Interestingly, those officers performing the undercover operations will most likely be able to identify people who are important in the offender's life. One influential is really all that is needed and you should be able to build from there.*



- Who makes up the notification team?

*It should be noted that contacting influentials and invited call-in attendees is very time consuming. Ideally, the team would consist of a respected community member, clergy or someone of that nature as well as someone from the police department. This may not always be possible. Regardless, the group should remain small and personable. Some sites have reported never being able to directly contact the call-in invitee and only being able to reach an influential so each visit made by the team is very important.*

- Will the offenders and the influentials cooperate?

*This is the million dollar question. Some sites use a “hook” like probation or parole, if they are able, to strongly encourage the call-in invitee to attend. However, some sites do not pull this lever even if it is available. In some cases it was actually the influentials who convinced the offender to attend the call-in. Experience has shown that a very high percentage of invited attendees actually showed up at the call-in. In general, community members and influentials are supportive of the initiative and attend the call-in.*

- How long does this take?

*Experience has shown this can take up to two weeks (refer to Appendix 3A).*

### **Step 6a- Contact Call-in Candidates**

Goal: Send letter to Call-In candidates.

- Mail letter from the Chief of Police and/or Sheriff to the Call-In candidate
  - The police are aware of their street-level drug dealing
  - This behavior has to stop
  - Invite offender to a meeting (i.e., the Call-in)
  - Note that the offender will not be arrested at the Call-in
  - Suggest that the offender bring to the meeting someone who is important to them

### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- How do you convince invitees that this is not a trap?
- How do you convince influentials that this is not a trap?

*It will be the job of those people making contact with the call-in invitees and their influentials to convincingly convey that the invitation is not a trap. Most sites have a written letter from the Chief of Police stating this is not a trick. The high percentage of invitees that actually attend the call-in demonstrates that this message is believable.*

- Will the invitees actually show up?

*Experience has shown that a high percentage of invited offenders do attend the meeting (refer to Appendix 3A). Rockford (IL) went so far as to provide financial assistance to an invitee who was out of town to attend their call-in.*

### **Step 7- Call in/Notification**

#### **Step 7a- Services available at the Call-in**

Goal: Determining what services and arranging for services to be available at the call in.

- Arrange for a wide variety of services to offer to the Call-in Candidates at the Call-in
  - Drug/alcohol/substance abuse treatment
  - Education
  - Job training
  - Pathways to gainful employment
  - Help with family issues
  - Transportation
  - Ex-offender mentoring

#### **Common Questions/Issues:**

- Who needs to be there?

*Once the call-in candidates are identified, it will be easier to put together a list of possible needed services. The list above covers all the basics but there may be others that can be identified based on the candidate (e.g. candidate has small children and may be in need of child care). For example, Nashville (TN) did extensive pre-call-in work with the invitees to determine what services they would need. Think about planning for the needs of offenders in immediate, intermediate and long term steps.*

- How to prepare the service providers?

*Thankfully, you should not be asking the service providers to do anything different than they usually do. However, it will be imperative to know whether or not the invited service providers have worked with ex-offenders before. If not, the unique issues that accompany ex-offenders will need to be addressed prior to the call-in. What you will be asking these service providers to do differently is to place the candidates on a fast track services. If candidates do not get the services promised right away, it cannot be expected that they will stop dealing drugs. Also, if you will be expecting the service providers to supply information or data for evaluation purposes, you should be clear and upfront about these expectations.*

- How do you get buy-in from these services?

*A lot of service organizations you approach may respond by telling you “we already serve this clientele—send them to us.” Like other stakeholders, you will need to convince them that you are taking a different approach and will most likely be bringing people to their attention that would otherwise not seek out their services. Additionally, service organizations may express that they are stretched thin and almost to the point of breaking already. You are not asking them to take on 100 more clients. The number will be small and finite.*

- Who will coordinate?

*Having a resource coordinator as a central point for communication, reporting, and oversight of services can be very beneficial. While Baltimore (MD) and Atlanta (GA) were able to get the City to hire a coordinator, most sites do not create this position from scratch. Consider utilizing or “piggy-backing” someone already in this type of position,*

*someone who works with this type of population and is familiar with the issues that may arise.*

- What if we cannot get all the services we think are needed?

*There is no way to be able to anticipate every service that might be needed. Knowledge of local resources and leaders in those organizations is key. Someone should be identified as the person who will follow-up with the candidates to ensure that they are getting what they need and were promised. It makes sense also to have this person locate services for candidates that were not available at the call-in. Having a service coordinator, or individual mentors willing to work with offenders, can be an important resource to have in place if other services are not available or not readily available to the offender.*

- Do you have actual jobs available?

*Experience has shown that the call-in candidates will not be ready for a full-time job. They will need training and education, possibly a temporary or part-time job before they are ready for full-time employment. So, instead of telling candidates “we will help you find a job” tell them “we will help prepare you for a job.”*

- Who will follow-up with candidates?

*It cannot be stressed enough how important follow-up is with the candidates. It should be decided well in advance of the call-in who will follow-up with the candidates and ensure they are getting the services he or she requested. The offender mentality is that it is easier to keep doing what they are doing (something wrong or illegal) than to ask for help which makes the follow-up even more important.*

- Delivering what is promised.

*Credibility is critical. The DMI will fail if what is promised to the candidates is not delivered. This goes for both services and arrest if rules are not followed. The community is demanding these individuals stop dealing drugs in their neighborhood in return for services if they so desire. While all may not take advantage of the offered services, it is critical that those requests that are made are filled. Also, if candidates choose not to stop dealing, it is crucial that the police and prosecutor make good on their promises of arrest and prosecution.*

- Responding instantly to needs of candidates.

*If you are unable to respond to the immediate needs of the candidates, you will likely “lose” them. That is, word will get out that you did not follow through with your end of the bargain and the candidate will not have reason to stop dealing drugs. Additionally, word will spread very quickly of your failures—just as quickly as it will spread about your successes. It is imperative that you be ready to respond to the immediate needs of your candidates at the call-in. If you are not, postpone the call-in. On the other hand, do not be paralyzed by worrying about every conceivable service request. As noted above, the key is credibility. Having someone who will respond to the call-in candidate requests is of the utmost importance for developing and maintaining credibility.*

## Step 7b- The Call-in

Goal: Conduct the Call-in.

- Face to face meeting between the offenders, the community, and law enforcement
- Display fruits of undercover work
  - Picture of drug dealers
  - Pictures of drug dealers in action
  - Pictures of the drug deal houses and street corners where transactions take place
- Three-ring notebook about each offender made available
  - All the information the police have about that offender and their drug dealing habits
  - Unsigned arrest warrant for that offender.
- The police will deliver a very strong two-pronged message.
  - First- drug dealing and violence will no longer be tolerated in the target area
  - Second- each of the offenders will be put on “official notice”
  - Evidence has been collected; candidate is being given a second chance
- Communicate strong community message.
  - Convey the message that they find the offender’s behavior unacceptable
  - Offer help in the form of community resources to those that want it
    - Drug treatment
    - Education
    - Job training
    - Gainful employment
    - Help with family issues
    - Transportation
    - Mentoring
- Give offenders a deadline to cease and desist their drug dealing activities

### ***Common Questions/Issues:***

- Who will speak? In what order?
- Keeping control of the call-in.
  - Message
  - Time

*First, keep the meeting short- 60 to 90 minutes. The most common approach is to have the police speak, then the prosecutor, both presenting a strong law enforcement message: we know what you have been doing, we have proof, and we will arrest and prosecute if you do not stop what you are doing. Next, the community will speak presenting the community message: we will no longer tolerate this in our neighborhoods. We invite you to remain part of our community, as long as you stop dealing drugs in our neighborhood. Finally, the services message: we are here to help you. It is your choice as to whether or not you take advantage of what we have to offer. Regardless, your drug dealing days are over. Nothing is worse than a long message that is not on target. It may be worthwhile to help prepare your speakers. Give them time limits and stick to them.*

- Do you use metal detectors?

*This is another question where there is no right or wrong answer. Some sites conducting non-DMI call-ins (i.e. offender notification meetings) have used metal detectors while others have not. There are pros and cons to each side. Often there is concern about who should be allowed to observe the call-in (i.e. individuals that do not have an active role in the call-in). This is something to discuss well in advance of making any invitations.*

- What is the role of the defense attorney, if any?

*The defense attorney is not invited to the call-in in relation to the candidate. The candidates are not being charged with any crime at this point. However, there have been instances where defense attorneys have spoken to the call-in candidates as part of the law enforcement message stressing the risk of not taking the opportunity presented.*

## **POST CALL-IN**

### ***Step 8- Enforcement***

Goal: Enforcement of cease and desist order and no tolerance message.

- Police and the community watch for any signs of continued street-level drug dealing in the target area
- Police continue to try to make buys in the area
- Police continue to send in confidential informants into confirmed drug locations.
- Encourage residents to call the police
- Calls from residents given high priority by police
- Reports of dealing will be immediately investigated by police and additional narcotics officers will be assigned to the area
- Complaints involving a notified offender will result in a judge signing his or her arrest warrant and ultimately his or her arrest
- Prosecutor's office will assign one assistant district attorney to these cases and so they will be given "special" treatment by the prosecutor's office

**Common Questions/Issues:**

- How to pay for extra patrols?

*The ideal would be if the police department can incorporate the temporary extra patrols as part of their everyday routine for a short period of time. Are there special units that can be deployed to the area for a short time? Could officers not responding to calls for service help patrol the target area? If the DMI is working like it should you will not need an “occupying army” to maintain the market shut down. The goal is to assist the neighborhood in developing capacity found in most neighborhoods – we will not tolerate open drug dealing. The community members should be helping by patrolling themselves. If extra patrols in the target neighborhood cannot be integrated into the normal duties of the police department it may be necessary to pay overtime for such patrols. It is common knowledge that most if not all police departments are under fiscal strain and are being continually asked to do more work with less resources. This is a situation where it might be helpful to look towards other existing criminal justice programs that include the target area.*

*Sites have handled this issue different. High Point used Weed and Seed funds for their extra patrols. They also promised immediate response to drug related 911 calls in the area. They also gave out a narcotics Sergeant’s cell phone number for community members to use if they felt they were not getting the police response they wanted.*

*Providence (RI) gradually decreased their police presence. They told the community that they would “respond every time you call us but you need to take ownership.” In Nashville (TN), the police placed an officer on the corner for the first week after the call-in to signal the change to the community and particularly to the buyers. Additionally, they notified the neighborhood association every time they made an arrest so they would know the police were responding to their complaints.*

*As a Deputy Commander from Nashville (TN) stated, “we broke the cycle between dealers and users and this gave the neighborhood the time to breathe and then to re-assert control.” At the other end of the spectrum, Hempstead Police Department enlisted funding to ensure an increased police presence in the target area.*

- What other type of resources can be enlisted?

*Public housing authorities and police, nuisance abatement authorities, community prosecution, local foundations, crime watch groups, the faith community. The Rockford Police Department (IL) sent letters to landlords and asked the community development corporation to work with the landlords to “raise the standards” for the neighborhood.*

*Police in Hempstead (NY) deployed their license plate reader during late night and early morning hours in the former drug market area. Vehicle owners whose license plate was from outside the local zip code and who were found driving through the neighborhood at times suggestive of possible drug buying received a letter from the chief of police noting that the vehicle was observed in this area.*

- What are other tactics to encourage communication from the community?

*Sites have used fliers, posters, and communication through crime watch groups (e.g., block captains), just to name a few, as methods of encouragement for communication. Several communities have held community celebrations to note the positive change in the neighborhood. In Providence (RI), the police department made any call from the target neighborhood a priority. The Commander said, “We made a deal with the community. We made the initial impact now you (the community) need to take ownership. We will respond every time you call.”*

- How do we handle re-offending?
- How do we define failure?

*These are issues that will need to be thought through PRIOR to the call-in and should involve the entire team. If the police and prosecutor do not follow through on their promises, word will spread fast and the DMI will lose its integrity and credibility. You should be clear to the candidates in what you define as reasons for arrest and prosecution of his or her held cases. What, if any, criminal behavior, will be tolerated? For example, in High Point (NC) a call-in candidate was a passenger in a car where marijuana was being smoked. The police decided not to activate the pending cases because the candidate made the point that “...you told me to stop dealing drugs, you never said I had to stop using them.” Hempstead (NY) took a more strict approach, activating the held cases for ANY arrest, regardless of the charges. This was considered critical to the credibility of its deterrence message.*

- How long to we hold these cases over the candidate’s head?

*Again, another issue that should be discussed, but maybe not completely resolved, PRIOR to the call-in. It comes down to the question of do you ever stop holding the cases? This may be influenced by statute or policy of the prosecutor’s office.*

**Step 9- Follow up**

Goal: Follow up with call in candidates on promised resources.

- Resource coordinator/designated team member contact the notified offenders to determine if they are getting the help they need
- Assign mentors to notified offenders
- Encourage the community to keep in touch with them through phone calls and visits
- Police department will put out newsletters and flyers containing information about the targeted drug dealers that have been arrested as well as those that chose a different path
- Police continue to attend community meetings in the area to maintain the lines of communication
- Close monitoring of the crime data with continual feedback from the research partners

**Common Questions/Issues:**

- Accountability

*Send in undercover officers and confidential informants regularly to try and buy drugs. Enlist the services of researchers and/or crime analysts to evaluate the impact of the DMI. Jim Summey, Executive Director of the High Point Community Against Violence, talks about a circle of accountability whereby local neighborhood residents hold the police and themselves accountable for maintaining the quality of life within the neighborhood.*

- Sustainability

*In High Point, the City Manager made a commitment to provide job opportunities to call-in participants. This both created credibility with local employers and invested city government in the success of the program.*

➔ **Example:** Rockford Police Department (RPD) officials reported that one month following the call-in they were involved in a community meeting where “we heard the community say, don’t leave us.” Consequently, RPD created a cross-functional response to this community concern. This involved enlisting DUI and canine patrols, Neighborhood Resource Officers (NRO) working with the neighborhood association, city public works conducting lighting survey and installing lights, street sweepers cleaning the streets, and the NRO utilizing city code enforcement to influence landlords. Officials state, “we are raising the standards for the neighborhood.”

**III. RELATED ACTIVITIES**

***Building in an assessment component***

Goal: Be able to assess the impact of the drug market intervention.

- Bring in crime analysis and research collaborators
- Identify a comparison drug market location
- Identify process and outcome performance measures
- Decide whether to measure individual-level as well as community-level impact
- Collect pre- and post-data for target and comparison sites

**Common Questions/Issues:**

- With whom should we partner?

*You might consider partnering with a local researcher from the very beginning. He or she could help with data issues, the incident review, and most importantly, evaluations are much easier to complete when they are included from the beginning of an initiative. Trust is important though. Inviting a researcher to the table that is not trusted by the team members is a waste of time on everyone’s part. If your team is unable to find someone locally, you might contact the BJA technical assistance team or other DMI sites who have partnered with researchers and get their suggestions.*



- Thinking about building in an evaluation from the beginning.

*Oftentimes evaluation is an afterthought. We would suggest including an evaluation component from the beginning of any new criminal justice initiative. It really is the only way to answer the question, does this work? There are two types of evaluations, process and outcome. Process evaluations seek to examine implementation. Did DMI get implemented as you intended? Outcome evaluations look at impact. First and foremost—did you shut down the drug market? High Point (NC), Rockford (IL) and Nashville (TN) have been working with researchers on formal evaluations.*

***After Action Debrief***

Goal: Summarize and evaluate your efforts.

Once the call-in is complete and some time has passed, it would be extremely beneficial to all involved for your group to sit back and examine how things went. Were you able to meet the four overall DMI goals 1) eliminate open-air drug markets; 2) return the neighborhood to the residents; 3) reduce crime and disorder; and 4) improve public’s safety as well as their quality of life? Was everything implemented according to plan? What would you do differently next time? What would you leave the same? Another SWOT inventory might be a good idea. Here again, an outside researcher can help with this summarization and self assessment.

**IV. PLAN FOR NEXT DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION**

***Common Questions/Issues:***

- Where do we go next?

*Once you have shut down one market, are there others that need to be shut down? Where do the data indicate you should go next? Milwaukee has begun with two police districts as target areas. The initial intervention focused on a drug market in one of the police districts. As this operation was underway, a second initiative focused on a drug market in the second police district.*

- What have we learned that we might do differently?

*It is always wise to sit back and assess how things went. This is where a researcher can help with both a process and outcome evaluation—did you implement the DMI the way you intended to? If not, what did not go according to plan? Did you shut down the drug market? Did that have an effect on calls for service, crime, community feeling of safety, etc.?*

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
**VI. APPENDIX**

*Figure A1: Drug Market Intervention Action Plan Implemented by the Rockford Police Department*

<b>Strategy</b>	<b>Step</b>	<b>Description</b>
Identification (February, 2007)	1	Research analysts at RPD mapped index offenses, drug arrests, and drug complaints for the entire city.
Mobilization (March, 2007)	1	Law enforcement officials determined that the Alternative Drug Program (ADP) West neighborhood, consisting of two sub-beats, would be the ideal locale for the DMI intervention.
Intelligence Gathering (March, 2007)	2	A narcotics unit officer at RPD supervised intelligence gathering on individuals who engaged in chronic drug dealing in the APD West neighborhood.
Incident Review (March, 2007)	3	Narcotics detectives conducted a complete incident review of all known offending in APD West. All reports and contacts with police (including intelligence gathered from cooperating witnesses) were examined. Twelve persistent offenders were identified.
Undercover Investigation (March-April, 2007)	4	Narcotics detectives made controlled buys from the twelve identified drug dealers over the course of eight weeks. Surveillance equipment was used to record the purchases, as was the use of cooperating witnesses.
DMI Eligibility Meeting (April, 2007)	3a	A multi-agency committee reviewed the cases made against the twelve individuals and relied upon the use of criminal histories (e.g., the number of violent offenses and the total number of offenses) to identify five dealers who would be eligible for the pulling levers meeting.
Notice to Residents (May 7, 2007)	5	RPD notified residents at a local community meeting that an undercover investigation had been conducted over the past couple of months and that an immediate response was about to take place.
Sweep of Violent Offenders (May 7 & 8, 2007)	Prior to 7	Within 48 hours of the May 7, 2007 notification meeting, the seven violent offenders who were ineligible for the DMI strategy were subsequently arrested and received \$500,000 bonds.
Contact with Eligible Offenders' Families (May 7 & 8, 2007)	6a	RPD made phone calls, and relied upon a pastor at a local church to notify offenders of the call-in by contacting their families. The Chief of Police also wrote a letter to each offender guaranteeing they would not be arrested at the meeting. The RPD provided assistance for those out of town to ensure their attendance.

<p>The Call-in (May 9, 2007)</p>	<p>7</p>	<p>The offenders, their families, key criminal justice personnel, and community members attended the notification hearing. First, residents spoke of the harm that drug dealing caused in their community. Next, offenders and their families received the deterrent message from multi-agency members that continued offending would not be tolerated. Finally, an immediate needs assessment was made by social support services, followed by a more detailed assessment in the following weeks. Offenders were given 24 hours to report to probation and all met this requirement.</p>
<p>Community Follow-Up (May 8, 2007)</p>	<p>8-9</p>	<p>RPD and housing inspectors seized five housing complexes where prior drug offending had been prominent. Social service officials assisted in moving residents who did not previously engage in illegal drug distribution into new homes. Maintenance code citations (e.g., lawn, trash, and poor fencing) were written for violations throughout the neighborhood. A street-sweeper cleaned the streets to symbolize the change that was occurring.</p>
<p>Long Term Follow-Up</p>	<p>8-9</p>	<p>RPD continues routine and saturated patrols in the neighborhood. Community source officers and community leaders maintain communication for up-to-date information on neighborhood issues. The department has made responding to drug distribution in this neighborhood an immediate priority to reduce the likelihood of the market re-emerging.</p>
<p>Impact Evaluation</p>	<p>Ideally at 1</p>	<p>Michigan State University assessment finds a 31 percent decrease in property crime and a 15 percent reduction in violent crime. Both decreases were statistically significant. During this same period, the rest of the city experienced a six percent decline in both property and violent crime. Thus, it appears that the drug market intervention had a significant impact on crime in the ADP West neighborhood.</p>

Figure A2: Drug Market Intervention Logic Model



**Source:** Dr. James M. Frabutt et al., at The Center for Youth, Family, and Community Partnerships at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro serving as the Project Safe Neighborhoods Research Partner for the United States Attorney’s Office, Middle District of North Carolina. Supported by PSN funding (Award #2002-GP-CX-0220) through the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

Figure A3: DMI Summary Implementation Information by Site

<b>Common Questions</b>			
	<b>Smallest</b>	<b>Largest</b>	<b>Most common</b>
<b>What is the “average” size of a target area?</b>	2-3 blocks	2.3 miles	Under 12 blocks
	<b>Smallest</b>	<b>Largest</b>	<b>Average</b>
<b>How many active dealers were identified?</b>	7	59	27
<b>How many were <i>arrested</i> before the Call-in?</b>	4	43	15
<b>How many were <i>invited</i> to the Call-in</b>	2*	23	8
<b>How many <i>attended</i> the Call-in</b>	2*	22	7
	<b>Shortest</b>	<b>Longest</b>	<b>Most common</b>
<b>How long did you do undercover work?</b>	30 days	300 days	Between 60-90 days
<b>When did you execute the arrests?</b>	Day of call-in	2 weeks prior	1 week prior
			<b>Most common</b>
<b>Where did you hold the call-in?</b>			Church, Community Center or similar place, Police Station
<b>Do you use metal detectors?</b>			No sites have used metal detectors

\*One site did not invite anyone to the call-in and therefore no one attended.

Source: These data are compiled by the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University based on information provided by the sites. These data are current as of 4/1/2010 and include information from roughly 30 unique DMI sites. Only data for those sites that have completed the call-in step are included. For an up to date and more detailed table please visit <http://drugmarketinitiative.msu.edu>.